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Notes and Comments
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF WITHDRAWAL
OF FEDERAL TAX BENEFITS FROM PRIVATE
SEGREGATED SCHOOLS
Bob Jones University v. Connally'
Bob Jones University is a fundamentalist religious corporation founded in 1926 and now located in South Carolina. The
University's program of religious training is an integral part of
student life. Students are chosen for admission on the basis of
their religious beliefs in addition to their academic qualifications.2 Among the beliefs held and promulgated by the University
since its founding are the principles that God intended that the
races should live separate and apart and that intermarriage of the
races is contrary to the will of God and the teachings of the Holy
Scriptures. As a result, the University has adopted an admissions
policy "controlled by its religious beliefs' 3 which prohibits the
admission of black students.
As a charitable, religious and educational institution, Bob
Jones has received tax exemptions and advance assurance of the
deductibility of contributions made to it under the Internal Revenue Code since at least 1942.1 In response to an IRS press release
1. 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1973).
2. All students attend daily chapel services, and meetings and classes are begun and
ended with prayers. Classes in religion are required each semester, and any student or
faculty member advocating religious beliefs contrary to those of the University is subject
to dismissal. Bob Jones University v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D.S.C. 1971).
3. Brief for Appellee at 2, Bob Jones University v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir.
1973).
4. The record at the trial court contains a letter received by Bob Jones from the
Deputy Commissioner of the IRS referring to an April, 1942 ruling that the University
qualified under what is presently INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501(c)(3) as a tax exempt
organization. The University has enjoyed that status to date.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(c)(2) allows an individual to deduct from his adjusted
gross income contributions to a "corporation, trust .... or foundation. . . organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable . . .or educational purposes." The maximum percentage of adjusted gross income subject to offset by charitable deductions is
boosted from the normal twenty percent to thirty-nine percent for educational institutions
by INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(b)(A)(ii). INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501(c)(3) exempts
from federal income tax the income of organizations of the same genre of section 170(c)(2),
and is the basis for the charitable deduction. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2522 exempts
donors from gift tax on contributions to such organizations, and INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2055 allows charitable bequests to be deducted from the taxable estate in computing
federal estate tax. See generally Spratt, Federal Tax Exemption for Private Segregated
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of July 1970 denying tax benefits to private segregated schools,5
Bob Jones and IRS officials initiated a series of discussions concerning federal tax benefits received by the University. When
negotiations failed, the University sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue and the Secretary of the Treasury from carrying out the
expressed policy of the IRS.'
The United States District court for the District of South
Carolina granted the preliminary injunction because it found that
the University would suffer irreparable injury through the loss of
contributions resulting from the revocation of the University's tax
exempt status pending a hearing on the merits.7 The court noted
that the University's discriminatory admissions policy sprang
from a long-standing religious conviction, and, relying on Walz v.
Tax Commission,8 indicated that the retention of a tax exemption
for Bob Jones, granted in "benevolent neutrality toward churches
and religious exercises," 9 was the only course available to the IRS
compatible with the religion clauses of the first amendment.
The Fourth Circuit did not reach the merits of the case. 0
Schools: the Crumbling Foundation, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Spratt].
5. Until 1967 the Internal Revenue Service consistently granted tax exemptions to
racially segregated private schools under the charitable sections of the Internal Revenue
Code. In 1967, the IRS announced that tax benefits under the Code "will be denied...
if the operation of the school is on a segregated basis and its involvement with the state
or political subdivision is such as to make the operation unconstitutional or a violation of
the laws of the U.S." IRS News Release (Aug. 2, 1967), 7 CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
6734. Later in 1970, the IRS dropped the "state involvement" requirement of the 1967
release and announced that it would revoke and deny tax benefits to any private school
which practiced racial discrimination. IRS News Release (July 10, 1970), 7 CCH 1970
STAND. FED. TAX REP.
6790. The present policy is stated in a recent revenue ruling. The
ruling justifies the denial and revocation of exemptions and deductible contribution status
to segregated schools under a "national policy to discourage racial discrimination in education, whether public or private." A racially non-discriminatory policy is defined in the
ruling as one which admits "students of any race to all the rights, privileges, programs
and activities generally accorded or made available to students at that school." Rev. Rul.
71-447, 1971-2 CUM. BULL 230. See generally Trayer, Effect of Racial or other Discrimination on Tax Exemption, in FOUNDATIONS, TAX EXEMPT STATUS AND CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS (Practicing Law Inst. 1972) for a comprehensive survey of these rulings and
decisions.
6. The University claimed that the threatened withdrawal of tax advantages exceeded the authority vested in the IRS by Congress, was contrary to the provisions of INT.
REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 170 and 501(c)(3), and was in violation of the first and fifth
amendments.
7. 341 F. Supp. 277 (D.S.C. 1971).
8. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
9. Id. at 676-77.
10. 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1973).
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Instead, Judge Winter, speaking for a divided three-judge court,
held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case
under section 7421 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which
prohibits suits ". . . for the purpose of restraining the assessment
or collection of any tax."'" Rejecting the district court's argument
that the statute was inapplicable because no assessment of a
deficiency had been made, Judge Winter concluded that "[t]he
common sense of the matter is that where, as we have shown, the
necessary result of granting the relief prayed would be to prevent
the assessment of any tax, § 7421 is applicable."'" The court also
found that the University failed to come within the ambit of
Enochs v. Williams Packing Co.,1 3 a well-recognized exception to
section 7421. Although the University met the first test of
Williams, that of showing irreparable injury, it failed to meet the
second criterion, that of demonstrating that "under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail.""
Judge Boreman, in a strong dissent, agreed with the district
court's finding that since the primary purpose of the IRS in
threatening the withdrawal of tax benefits was not to generate
revenues but to coerce the University into changing its admission
practice to conform to expressed social objectives outlined by
IRS, both the letter and spirit of section 7421 and Williams were
inapplicable.'"
This position is sound. Although it is true that only under
exceptional circumstances should injunctive relief be available to
restrain the assessment of taxes,'" the section is general in its
terms and should not apply when there is a convincing showing
by the taxpayer of illegality of collection and extraordinary circumstances warranting judicial interference with the collection of
revenues.' 7 Such circumstances in the form of gross injury to the
educational institution and the motives of the IRS in assessing
the tax certainly warrant leniency of statutory construction in
this case.
These jurisdictional issues are not germane to the body of
this note, particularly since the Fourth Circuit, by dismissing the
11. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7421.
12. 472 F.2d at 906.
13. 370 U.S. 1(1962).
14. 472 F.2d at 906.
15. 472 F.2d at 907.
16. McGowan v. United States, 296 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1961), on remand 222 F. Supp.
329 (S.D. Fla. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1963).
17. Transport Mfg. & Equipment Co. v. Trainor, 382 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1967);
United States Mutual Benefit Ass'n v. Welch, 268 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1959).
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case, merely postponed a decision on the merits to a later time."
However the court's decision on the jurisdictional question is certainly significant in and of itself, and may prove to be a milestone
in tax law.
In dictum, Judge Winter commented favorably on the decision in Green v. Connally.'9 He noted that Green had relied on
the statutory argument that section 501(c)(3) required that any
exempt organization satisfy the common law concept of "charitable" and that under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the fourteenth
amendment, and the Supreme Court's school desegregation
cases, it was unlikely that a private school which violated federal
public policy by practicing racial discrimination could qualify as
"charitable" under the section. 20 Although these and other statutory arguments are at least arguably valid, 2' this note will discuss
18. Undoubtedly, as the court noted, the IRS will issue a notice of deficiency which
will be challenged in the Tax Court under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6213, or paid and
subsequently challenged in a suit for a refund under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7422, thus
eventually bringing the merits of the case squarely before the courts.
19. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971) aff'd per curiam sub. nom. Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971).
20. 472 F.2d at 907.
21. The purpose of this note is to highlight some of the peculiar problems which the
unique facts of Bob Jones generate in relationship to the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. Simply stated, the constitutional argument is that a tax exemption is an
impermissive degree of government involvement with private discriminatory organizations which renders the organizations subject to the mandates of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment and the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164-65; Allen, The Tax Exempt Status of
Segregated Schools, 24 TAx L. REv. 409, 413-24 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Allen).
Four additional arguments normally advanced are not dealt with at length in this
note: First, the system of private secregated schools which was born in the 1960's, rather
than being organized "exclusively" for religious purposes under sections 170 and 501(c) (3)
of the Internal Revenue Code, was organized for the purpose of avoiding desegregation,
and therefore does not come within the ambit of the statute. See Allen, supra, at 424-26.
This argument has yet to be employed in a court decision.
Second, although on its face the Code exempts any school, the charitable sections are
subject to the common law of charitable trusts, and therefore, like racially discriminatory
trusts, organizations which practice racial discrimination are uncharitable and not entitled to a charitable exemption. See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1157-61; Spratt,
supra note 3, at 9-24; Allen, supra at 426-29.
Third, the Internal Revenue Code must be applied in consonance with other official
laws and policies, including the United States Constitution, Brown, and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1970) and therefore to allow tax
benefits to segregated organizations would frustrate this national policy. This is called the
"Tank Truck Doctrine" after Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30
(1958) in which the Supreme Court held that fines imposed on the owners of trucks for
violations of state maximum weight laws were not deductible as "ordinary and necessary"
business expenses under INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 23 (a)(1)(A) because the allowance of
the deduction would frustrate defined state policies. See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp.
at 1161-64; Spratt, supra note 4, at 24-33; Allen, supra, at 1429.
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the broader issue of the relationship of the University and the
federal government under the fifth amendment. The concept of
governmental entanglement is implied in the charitable exemption, and the allegation of unconstitutionally excessive governmental involvement is fundamental to any challenge of the University's exempt status.
GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION

The fourteenth amendment prohibits the states from denying any person the equal protection of the laws. The Supreme
Court has held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment
imposes on the federal government a similar duty to refrain from
racial discrimination.22 In 1954 the Supreme Court announced
that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
precluded racial segregation in the public schools of the United
23
States in the historic decision of Brown v. Board of Education.
Brown triggered a decade of litigation invalidating tuition
grants,2 4 scholarships and transportation grants,25 and grants-inaid,26 which devices in essence "resegregated" 27 the South by supporting another dual system of schools-a private system for
whites and a public system for blacks.
However, in all of the cases involving discrimination in segregated private schools, there was some form of involvement between the school system and the government aside from a tax
exemption which was sufficient to implicate the government in
private discrimination. Each case involved ". . . a system of private schools operated on a racially segregated basis as an alternative available to white students seeking to avoid desegregated
public schools."" The system was supported by the state by some
Fourth, tax benefits constitute "federal financial assistance" under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 which forbids discrimination in programs receiving such assistance. The relevant language of Title VI reads: "No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). See Allen, supra, at 429-31.
22. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. Coffey v. Education Fin. Comm., 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Griffin
v. Board of Educ., 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965).
25. Pettaway v. School Bd., 230 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va. 1964).
26. Lee v. Board of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1964).
27. United States v. Board of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 848 (5th Cir. 1966).
28. Coffey v. Education Fin. Comm., 296 F. Supp. 1389, 1392, quoted in Green v.
Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1133-34 (D.D.C. 1970).

56
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form of direct subsidy29 and was established "for the purpose of
avoiding the result of a unitary, non-racial public school system
required by the Federal court decisions outlawing segregation in
the public schools."3 The direct subsidies from the state were
held unconstitutional because they fostered the creation of, and
"encourage[d], facilitate[d], and support[ed] the establishment of" dual school systems."'
Bob Jones University, however, has few if any ties with the
state or federal government other than tax benefits. The University was established in the 1920's and not in response to desegregation decisions of the 1960's.2 The University has not participated in programs financed by the federal or state governments
because it understands that if it did so, it might be required to
adopt a non-discriminatory admissions policy. If the courts considering Bob Jones decide to rely on an equal protection-due
process rationale, they will be forced to decide whether the tax
benefits granted to the University under the Internal Revenue
Code are in and of themselves impermissible government participation in private racial discrimination. 3
The decisions which indicate that tax benefits may be impermissible government involvement in private discrimination rely
largely on Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority.3 4 In Burton,
the Court stated that the government may "place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination" by "ignoring" or "failing to discharge" its responsibilities.3 5 This suggests
that even through inaction, the government may "so far insinuate
itself into a position of interdependence with [the discriminatory
organization] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in
the challenged activity, which, on that account cannot be considered to have been . . . 'purely private' . . .- 3" Absence of an
29. 309 F. Supp. at 1134.
30. Id.
31. 296 F. Supp. at 1392.
32. It should be noted that because Bob Jones is an older institution and is not an
integral part of the dual school systems of the south, the rationale of Allen's exclusivity
argument, supra note 21, fails to apply to Bob Jones since the University was founded
"exclusively" for educational and religious purposes and not to avoid desegregation and
therefore fully satisfies the language of sections 170 and 501(c)(3).
33. The court in Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1137 (D.D.C. 1970) indicated
that the question of whether federal financial support through tax benefits violated the
due process clause was one of the "ultimate constitutional issues."
34. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
35. Id. at 725.
36. Id.
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expressed, active government sponsorship, then, does not preclude government responsibility for acts or policies which cause
or have the effect of fostering racial discrimination. A tax benefit,
of course, is a form of government "inaction" through the ignoring
of potential revenues and hence would conform to the Burton
rationale.
In Green v. Connally,37 black students and their parents
brought a class action to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury
from granting tax benefits under sections 170 and 501(c)(3) to
segregated private schools in Mississippi. The Green court
granted the preliminary injunction, holding that federal tax benefits could not be granted to organizations whose policies contravened well established federal public policy against support for
racial segregation of schools.3 8 Although the Green court avoided
the question of governmental involvement under the fifth amendment in its holding, its dicta on that subject was strong:
Clearly the Federal government could not under the Constitution give direct financial aid to schools practicing racial
discrimination. But tax exemptions and deductions certainly constitute a Federal benefit and support. While that
support is indirect, and is in the nature of a matching grant
rather than an unconditional grant, it would be difficult indeed to establish that such support can be provided consistently with the Constitution. 9
The District Court for the District of Columbia, which had
decided Green, took this reasoning one step further in McGlotten
v. Connally.40 In holding that a tax benefit to fraternal, non-profit
organization which excluded non-whites from membership was
sufficient government involvement to invoke the fifth amendment, the court, relying on Burton, stated:
• . . the Government does more than simply authorize deduction of contributions to any cause which the individual
taxpayer deems charitable. The statute, regulations, and
administrative rulings thereunder, define in extensive detail
not only the purposes which will satisfy the statute, but the
vehicles through which these purposes nmay be achieved as
37. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).
38. Id. at 1162-63.
39. 330 F. Supp. at 1164-65. But cf. Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D.
Ind. 1970); Guillory v. Administrator of Tulane University, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La.
1962).
40. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
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well. A contribution, even for an approved purpose, is deductible only if made to an organization of the type specified
in § 170 and which has obtained a ruling or letter of determination from the Internal Revenue Service. Thus the government has marked certain organizations "Government
Approved" with the result that such organizations may solicit funds from the general public on the basis of that approval."
In determining whether a tax exemption or assurance of deductibility of contributions is impermissible government involvement
in private discrimination, it has been generally recognized that
"only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the state in private conduct be attributed
its true significance."" It takes little sifting and weighing, however, to realize that a tax deduction is a "back door" expenditure.
Allowing a charitable deduction under section 170 or an exemption under section 501(c)(3) certainly confers a benefit on the
favored organization.43 Tax incentives such as those of section 170
involve a diversion of government revenues, and are clearly a
method of federal assistance." As one commentator states,
Deductions from gross income depend on "legislative grace
. ... " By allowing deductions from contributions to segre-

gated schools, Congress gives or bestows money over which
it has control and authority. Thus it may well be said that
41. Id. at 456. Green was also cited in Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp.
662 (E.D. Wis. 1971) in which a three-judge court held that state property tax exemptions
for private clubs were unconstitutional insofar as they benefited organizations whose
membership was limited to whites. The court concluded that tax exemption constituted
"significant state action encouraging discrimination..." 333 F. Supp. at 669.
42. 365 U.S. at 722. See generally Developments in the Law: Equal Protection,82
HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
43. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 n. 37.
44. The deduction for charitable organizations is a method of governmental assistance that promotes private decision making, in that the taxpayer, not the government,
selects the charity and decides how much he will give. See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a
Devise for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government
Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 705, 719 (1970). A taxpayer in the $20,000 income range
pays a fifty percent tax on each dollar exceeding $20,000. Therefore, if he deducts a $100
contribution for charity from his adjusted gross incoine, the federal government, in effect,
allows him to divert $50 to the charitable organization which the government would
otherwise have received in tax revenue. Tax exemptions and incentives amount to expenditures of over five billion dollars annually at the federal level alone. STONE, FEDERAL TAX
SUPPORT OF CHARITABLE AND OTHER EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL

POLICY 27 (U.S.C. Law Center Tax Institute 1970). Congress, in allowing the diversion of
those funds, affirmatively assures the continued existence of organizations such as Bob
Jones.
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through the operation of the Internal Revenue Code, under
which segregated private schools qualify for tax benefits, the
Internal Revenue Service bestows upon them a "grant" of
Federal financial assistance."
The extent of this federal assistance is graphically illustrated
in Bob Jones. Affidavits submitted by the University at trial
indicate that the "financial lifeblood of the University to a substantial extent is dependent upon contributions made to it.""
School officials indicated that should such assistance be curtailed, the University's existence would be jeopardized, and the
quality of education substantially diminished.
In view of Bob Jones's dependency on these funds and the
incentive the benefits afford to both charitable organizations and
donors, the federal government may well be said to have
"place[d] its power, property and prestige behind the admitted
discrimination" and "so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence" that it must be regarded as a joint partner in
the discrimination.4 7 The transfer of money from the federal government to the charitable organization is "blanket, automatic, no
strings attached, open-ended aid."48
Two recent decisions constitute a significant challenge to the
assertion that tax exemption of private segregated schools violates due process. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,49 the Supreme
Court held that the mere grant of a state liquor license, with
45. U.S. COMMISSION ON CivaL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966-67
234-35 (1967).
46. 341 F. Supp. at 281. Tax-free donations received by the University exceeded
$500,000 during the 1970-71 academic year. Tax exemptions benefit the University in
amounts ranging from $80,000 to $100,000 annually. Id.
The degree of federal support to private colleges is proportionately large. In the
hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 before the Senate Finance Committee, the American Council of Education testified that only one percent of donors gave seventy-five
percent of the gifts to higher education in 1962-63, and in the case of some colleges, gifts
of appreciated securities ran as high as fifty to seventy percent of total gifts from individuals. Since these gifts undoubtedly come from high-income donors, the donor is probably
using very little of his own funds. Hearings on Tax Reform Act of 1969 before the Fin.
Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 2168-71, 2207 (1969) quoted in Surrey, Federal
Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditureswith
Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HAv. L. REv. 352, 388 (1970).
In light of the American Council of Education's estimates, the contributions to Bob
Jones divert a sizeable percentage of $500,000 from the government to the University in
addition to the nearly $100,000 in tax exemptions given to the University.
47. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725.
48. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REv. 352, 385
(1970).
49. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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appropriate state regulation and supervision, did not "sufficiently implicate the State in the discriminatory guest policies of
the Moose Lodge so as to make the latter 'state action' within the
ambit of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."50 The Court noted that it "has never held . . .that discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be violative of
the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives any sort
of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is subject to state
regulation in any degree whatever. 5 The Court seems to have
regressed from the loose concept of government involvement in
Burton in stating that "[o]ur holdings indicate that where the
impetus for the discrimination is private, the state must have
'significantly involved itself with invidious discrimination' in
order for the discriminatory action to fall within the ambit of the
constitutional prohibition. 2
Although Moose Lodge may be a limitation of the government action concept, it is not in any manner an overruling of
Burton or its underlying rationale, and may be distinguished
from Bob Jones. State liquor licensing in Pennsylvania is a statewide scheme of alcohol control administered through a license
system by a Liquor Control Board. The system is indeed complete
and pervasive, but the state does not give any support, financial
or otherwise, to any of the organizations which it licenses. Although the state may decide who will receive licenses, no financial benefit accrues to the licensee other than profits from the sale
of liquor. No funds are transferred or withheld. In Bob Jones,
however, the government foregoes a substantial amount of revenue in order that the University may continue to exist as a viable
educational entity; the University itself admits that its existence
would be jeopardized by the withdrawal of federal benefits.
Clearly, the government indicates greater approval of an organization by granting it a charitablestatus under section 501(c)(3)
than by granting it a liquor license, since it has deemed the organ50. Id. at 177.
51. Id. at 173.
52. Id. The court's limited language is substantially that of Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967). The facts of Reitman, however, belie this citation, for the "state action"
in that case was the adoption of section 26 of Article 1 of the California Constitution by
public referendum, which made private discrimination legally possible by invalidating a
previously legislated fair housing law. More remote involvement can scarcely be imagined.
In this regard, however, the Court held in Moose Lodge that State Liquor Board regulations requiring compliance by the Moose Lodge with the provisions of its constitution and
by-laws containing a racially discriminatory provision did not involve the state in the
club's discriminatory practices under the fourteenth amendment.
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ization to be one of certain "entities that exist in a harmonious
relationship to the community at large, and that fosters its 'moral
or mental improvement.' [and] should not be inhibited in their
activities by taxation . . . the [government] has an affirmative
policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing
influences in community life and finds the classification useful,
desirable, and in the public interest."53
The legislative object in granting the tax exemption is, then,
to place the organization in a favorable economic position and
thus to promote its well being and the sphere of influence in
which it promulgates "good morals and respect for the law."54
Unlike a liquor license, a tax benefit is government "support of
segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds
or property [which] cannot be squared with the Fourteenth
Amendment's command." 55
In Walz v. Tax Commission,56 a taxpayer sought an injunction to prevent the New York Tax Commission from granting
property tax exemptions to religious organizations for properties
used solely for religious worship. In rejecting the petitioner's
claim that the exemption constituted an establishment of religion
under the first amendment, the Supreme Court stated, "the grant
of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does
not transfer part of its revenue to churches, but simply abstains
from demanding that the church support the state . . . [T]he
exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches."5
At first glance Walz seems to be a blow to the government's
case in Bob Jones. The involvement of the government in fifth
and fourteenth amendment cases such as McGlotten, and establishment of religion cases, such as Walz, is determined by the
same factor - an appearance that the institution is either supported or approved by public authority. Neutrality of the government is demanded in either case.58
53. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970).
.54. First Unitarian Church v. Council of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 419, 311 P.2d 508,
520 (1957).
55. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1950).
56. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
57. 397 U.S. at 675-76.
58. 397 U.S. at 669; Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. at 374. The first and fourteenth
amendment tests sound superficially alike. The "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement" language of Walz, 397 U.S. at 668 sounds surprisingly like the "support
through arrangement, management, funds or property" test of Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
at 619.
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Just as state action is a matter of "sifting and weighing"59
excessive government involvement with religion is "inescapably
one of degree.""0 Nevertheless, this does not mean that neutrality
in church-state relationships under the establishment clause also
constitutes neutrality in private-government relationships under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments.6 Tax exemption may be
the most amenable way to preserve the "wall of separation" between church and state because it is a "minimal and remote
involvement" when compared to the involvement and conflict
entailed in taxation.2 However, tax benefits are not the most
detached or neutral form of government involvement with private
organizations. Taxation is a constitutionally and practically acceptable alternative." Whatever the nature of tax benefits may
be in other contexts, they constitute significant involvement in an
equal protection or due process context where racial discrimination fostered by the state or federal government is perpetuated. 4
A tax exemption is an aid, and by granting such a benefit to
an organization, including a church or religious college, the exemption creates "an indirect subsidy, an abbreviated form of
appropriation" 5 which constitutes impermissible federal financial support and encouragement of an organization with discriminatory policies and practices. This conclusion results in a corresponding resolution of a more general dilemna; we must then
refuse to condone minimal governmental support of racially discriminatory activities in spite of the realization that governmental involvement with private organizations is a necessary adjunct
of a complex society, thus forcing many of those organizations
into financial crisis because our society has singled out racial
discrimination as a socially destructive phenomenon. Were the
59. 365 U.S. at 722.
60. 397 U.S. at 674.
61. In Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971), which
held that tax exemptions to private clubs which excluded non-whites were unconstitutional, the court distinguished Walz, and followed the rationale of Green and Bright v.
Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd 445 F.2d 4012 (1971), in stating that
"a different standard must be applied to ascertain state action in cases involving equal
protection than in cases involving other rights." Id. at 668.
62. Walz is an anomaly in tax law brought about by over 200 years of ubiquitous
property tax exemption for churches in this country. The Court undoubtedly considered
the overwhelming social upheaval that an opposite result would have created both in the
form of criticism and jeopardy to organized religion.
63. Accord, Allen, supra note 21, at 421.
64. Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. at 668.
65. Note, The Constitutionalityof Church Property Tax Exemptions Upheld by the
"Benevolent Neutrality" of the Supreme Court, 20 DE PAUL L. REv. 252, 261 (1970).
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IRS to withdraw tax benefits from Bob Jones, it would not be
prohibiting the actual discriminatory policies espoused or practiced by the University, but would simply be refusing to support
otherwise private discrimination with substantial federal backing. In reality, this will force Bob Jones and other organizations
who would otherwise qualify for tax benefits and who wish to
discriminate to stand on their own financial feet.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSE

If the courts allow the IRS to withdraw tax benefits from Bob
Jones University because of expressed religious practices of segregation, the question remains whether such action would conflict
with the first amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion."
It may be argued that examination of broader first amendment
issues is precluded by the proposition that assessment and collection of taxes by the IRS would not prohibit the practice of racially
discriminatory policies, but merely force the University to pursue
such policies without federal financial support.

In Cammarano v. United States," taxpayers argued that the

denial of deductions as "ordinary and necessary business expenses" for sums expended on publicity programs designed to defeat
measures pending before the state legislature was an abridgment
of speech protected by the first amendment. The Supreme Court
rejected the argument, stating: "Petitioners are not being denied
a tax deduction because they engage in constitutionally protected
activities, but are simply being required to pay for those activities
entirely out of their own pockets. ..",8
Although Cammarano dealt with the constitutional protection of speech rather than religious exercise, the rationale has
been used to uphold the denial of tax benefits to religious institutions.
In Parker v. Commissioner9 the court upheld the denial of a

tax exemption to the "Foundation for Divine Meditation."The
court, in deciding that the authority vested in the Commissioner
of the Internal Revenue Service to determine which organizations
will receive religious exemptions was not a prior restraint on the
freedom of religion, stated:
66. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibitU.S. CONST. amend. I.
ing the free exercise thereof.
67. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
68. 358 U.S. at 513.
69. 365 F.2d 792, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967).
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We believe it is constitutionally permissible to tax the income of religious organizations. . . Since the government
may constitutionally tax the income of religious organizations, it may decide not to exercise this power and grant
reasonable exceptions to qualifying organizations. . . The
receiving of an exemption is thus a matter of legislative grace
and not a constitutional right . . . Petitioners are free to
espouse their religious doctrine, to publish and to speak. . .
if they fail to qualify for this exemption they are still free to
practice their religion ....
10
Dictum of the court in Green v. Connally suggests the need
for a broader inquiry into the relationship of First Amendment
rights and racial discrimination, and leads to a questioning of the
place of religious freedom in our society:
• . . We are not now called upon to consider the hypothetical
inquiry of whether tax-exemption or tax deduction status
may be available to a religious school that practices acts of
racial restriction because of the requirements of religion.
Such a problem may never arise; and if it ever does arise, it
will have to be considered in the light of the particular facts
and issue presented, and in light of the established rule that
the law may prohibit an individual from taking certain actions even though his religion commands or prescribes
them. . . The freedoms of the Bill of Rights must be read not
in opposition to the safeguards of the Amendments adopted
after the Civil War, but in harmony with them, toward the
objective of continued national union. 7
The basic rationale for the proscription of religious activities
was established in the first major free exercise case, Reynolds v.
United States.72 There the Court upheld a congressional statute
which made polygamy illegal in the territories of the United
States against the contentions of Mormons that polygamy was
required of them by their religion and that, consequently, punish70. Id. at 795 (citations omitted). Cf. Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v.
United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972). See also Winters v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1972). These cases are distinguishable from the Supreme Court cases holding
that direct taxation of religious activities violates the first amendment, e.g. Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944),
because the taxes here are not imposed as a condition to the practice of a religious tenet.
See Brief for Appellants at 17, Bob Jones University v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir.
1973).
71. 330 F. Supp. at 1169 (citation omitted).
72. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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ing polygamy would deny them free exercise of their religion. The
Reynolds court held that, in light of the compelling interest of the
government in protecting the institution of marriage, "Congress
was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties
4
or subversive of good order." 3 With a few rare exceptions, case
law has not deviated from this principle in almost one hundred
years. The fear of the courts has been that leniency for religious
practices contrary to the expressed social order would allow every
citizen to become a "law unto himself' on the basis that his
religious beliefs were superior to the law of the land. '5
The approach of the courts in free exercise cases has been
called a "balancing test.'' 6 Although the idea of "balancing"
implies an equality of competing ideas, government interests
have almost always been held dominant, resulting in a dearth of
successful free exercise claims." In three landmark decisions,
73. 98 U.S. at 164.
74. See discussion at notes 86-89 infra.
75. See, e.g., 98 U.S. at 164; United States v. Leary, 383 F.2d 851, 859 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968).
76. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development,
Part I: The Religious Liberty Guaranty, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1381, 1389 (1967). Extensive
review of cases utilizing this test, however, fails to illuminate systematic criteria used by
courts to weigh the competing interests of state and religion. See Note, The Balancing
Process For Free Exercise Needs A New Scale, 51 N.C.L. REV. 302 (1972).
77. As a result, despite defenses that the activity in question was motivated by
religious convictions, the courts have almost universally forbade religious practices. See,
e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (parading and gathering in public);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccinations); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (polygamy); United States v.
Campbell, 439 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1971) (alternative military service); United States v.
Leary, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967) (drugs); Bilken v. Board of Educ., 333 F. Supp. 902
(N.D.N.Y. 1971) (oaths for teachers); Dawson v. Mizell, 325 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1971)
(termination of Sabbatarian who refused to work on Saturday upheld); Linscott v. Millers
Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 404
U.S. 872 (1971) (termination of Sabbatarian who refused to pay union dues upheld);
Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967); John
Fitzgerald Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971). Cf.
United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D.D.C. 1965) (transfusions); Cude v. State,
377 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1964) (vaccinations); Steiner v. Darby, 88 Cal. App. 2d 481, 199 P.2d
429, petition for cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 327 (1949) (oaths for state employees); East Side
Baptist Church v. Klein, 487 P.2d 549 (Colo. 1971) (zoning laws); Wooley v. Watkins, 2
Idaho 590, 22 P. 102 (1888) (polygamist barred from being elector); In re Green, 448 Pa.
338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (medical services); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947), Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E. 2d 409 (1947) (poisonous snakes
in religious ceremonies); State v. Verbon, 167 Wash. 140, 8 P.2d 1083 (1932) (faith-healing
without a license); State v. Neitzel, 69 Wash. 567, 125 P. 939 (1912) (fortune-telling).
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however, religious freedom has been held superior to governmental interests."8
In Sherbert v. Verner,7" a Seventh Day Adventist was discharged by her employer because, being a Sabbatarian, she refused to work on Saturday. Unable to obtain other employment,
she filed a claim for unemployment compensation under the
South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, and was denied compensation because she would not accept suitable work
which entailed working on Saturday. The Supreme Court held
that because she was forced to choose between following her religious beliefs and thus forfeiting unemployment compensation, or
abandoning her religious convictions to accept work, the state
had imposed a burden on her free exercise of religion. 0
78. In considering those factors which result in a successful defense under the free
exercise clause, it is more useful to focus on those few cases in which the claim has been
successful than to attempt to catalogue the innumerable cases proscribing religious practices in an effort to discover a pattern behind the infrequent exceptions. The latter method
has been thoroughly exploited. See Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83
HARV. L. REv. 327 (1969); Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A SociologicalApproach,
67 MICH. L. REv. 679 (1969); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development, PartI: The Religious Liberty Guaranty, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1967);
Weiss and Wizner, Pot, Prayer,Politics and Privacy: The Right to Cut Your Own Throat
in Your Own Way, 54 IOWA L. REv. 709 (1969).
One group of exceptions to the general limitation of religious practices is separable
from the other cases; among the rash of free expression cases during the 1940's, there were
a number of cases involving both free speech or press and free exercise claims. The courts
decided these cases on any one or all of these grounds, and because these cases are so
closely interwoven with other first amendment problems, they are not useful in the attempt to draw guidelines for decisions in cases involving only free exercise claims. E.g.,
Neimotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses for making speeches in a public park without a permit overturned on free speech and equal
protection grounds); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 941 (1943) (upholding right of Jehovah's Witnesses to ring doorbells on free exercise grounds); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that school children who were Jehovah's
Witnesses could not be forced to salute the flag on free exercise grounds); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (overturning convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses under
an ordinance requiring a license tax of solicitors on free exercise grounds); Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938) (upholding the right of Jehovah's Witnesses to sell literature door to
door without a permit on free press grounds).
79. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
80. In re Jennison, 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515, rev'd per curiam and remanded
375 U.S. 14, rev'd, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963), reached the Supreme Court
immediately after the decision in Sherbert, and involved the conviction of a woman for
refusing to serve on a jury due to her religious convictions. The Supreme Court remanded
the case in light of Sherbert, and the conviction was overruled by the Minnesota Supreme
Court. But cf. In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1942) (contempt of defendant who
refused to rise on religious grounds when judge entered upheld); Smilou v. United States,
465 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1972) (contempt of witness who refused to testify before grand jury
on religious grounds upheld).
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In People v. Woody,"' the California Supreme Court reversed
the convictions under a statute prohibiting the use and possession
of peyote of Navaho Indians who as members of the Native American Church had used peyote as a religious sacrament during
their ceremonies. The court held that members of the Church
were entitled to an exemption from the law in light of the burden
that observance of the statute would place on their free exercise
of religion.
Finally, in Wisconsin v. Yoder 2 members of the Old Order
Amish Church had been convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law by refusing to send their children
to public or private school after the eighth grade. The Wisconsin
trial court upheld the convictions under a long line of precedent,3
but was reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed, finding that high school attendance was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life, and that
the salvation of the parents and children, and even the existence
of the religion itself would be threatened by forced compliance
with the compulsory school attendance law. The court found this
threat to be superior to the state's claim as parens patriae in
extending the benefits of secondary school education to the
Amish children. The alternative mode of education provided by
the Amish was found to be sufficient to satisfy the intent of the
compulsory education law in preparing the children for lives as
responsible citizens.
Several characteristics of these cases are significant in tipping the "balance" toward religion and away from the government interest. First, the groups whose religious practices have
been upheld have been small, peripheral sects whose social and
political power have been negligible. Both the Amish and the
American Indians of the Native American Church are social
anomalies of long standing, tolerated paternalistically by our society. Both sub-cultures are easily distinguishable races or sects,
and in addition, both groups are unlikely to promulgate their
81. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). See also State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 32, 504 P.2d 950 (1973).
82. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See generally Note, Wisconsin's Compulsory Attendance
Law as Applied to Members of the Amish Religion violates Their Rights Under the Free
Exercise Clause of the FirstAmendment, 61 GEO. L. J. 236 (1972); Note, Amish Religion
vs. State Interest in Education, 50 J. URBAN L. 493 (1973).
83. E.g. Commonwealth v. Smoker, 177 Pa. Super. 462, 110 A.2d 740 (1955)
(Amish); Commonwealth v. Beiler, 108 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951) (Amish); People
v. Donner, 302 N.Y. 857, 100 N.E.2d 48 (1951) (Orthodox Jews); Wright v. State, 21 Okla.
Crim. 430, 209 P. 179 (1922) (Seventh Day Adventists).
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beliefs outside their own numbers. Quite the contrary, one of the
most important aspects of the Amish faith is the belief that separation from the worldliness of contemporary society is the sine
qua non of spiritual salvation. In contrast, in Reynolds, the Supreme Court upheld suppression of polygamy among Mormons in
the nineteenth century when Mormonism was a locally powerful,
rapidly proliferating sect for whom missionary practices were a
doctrinal imperative.
Economic threat to the majority of society was the principle
factor separating the otherwise indistinguishable cases of
Sherbert and Braunfeld v. Brown.84 The Braunfeld decision upheld Sunday Closing Laws over the protests of orthodox Jews
against "enforced Sunday togetherness. ' 5 Sunday Closing Laws
forced Jewish merchants to choose between the economic hardship of remaining closed on both Saturday and Sunday, and
abandonment of their religious beliefs, a situation very similar to
that in Sherbert. Nonetheless, the Court found that free exercise
claims were overridden by the economic advantage Jewish merchants would gain over non-Jewish businessmen if they were allowed to open on Sunday. In Sherbert, only a negligible number
of people actually received unemployment compensation under
the exemption provided by the decision; thus the powerful interests of the business community were not a factor.
Closely connected with the innocuous nature of the sect is the
number of people affected by a decision of the court to tolerate
the religious practice. There are between 20,000 and 50,000 Amish
in the United States.86 The Native American Church is also a
small sect, numbering less than 200,000 me:obers.87 In contrast,
there are over five million Jews and two and one-half million
Mormons in the United States. The smaller the number of people
potentially affected by the decision, the less likely is the religious
practice to spread, and the more identifiable the members of the
sect are likely to be, as the smaller sects tend to be socially and
geographically isolated.
Second, the courts weigh the degree of interference with the
religion in question which a proscription of the religious practice
will have. Peyote, for instance, is used as a sacrament in the
Native American Church, and is an object of worship central to
84.
85.
86.
87.

366 U.S. 599 (1961).
Id. at 616 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
J. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY (1968).
J. SLOTKIN, THE PEYOTE RELIGION (1956).
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the faith. In contrast, Timothy Leary's use of marijuana and
psychedelics in order to attain a "third level of consciousness"
was held to be only peripherally encouraged as part of his faith,
and his conviction for violating federal laws controlling marijuana
was upheld. 8
Perhaps the most vivid example of doctrinal interference is
the Yoder case. The Amish religion and mode of life are inseparable. Compulsory school attendance to age sixteen for Amish children carries with it a real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practices as they exist today by inducing
unwanted assimilation of Amish children into contemporary society. The Amish believe that such assimilation threatens the
salvation of Amish parents and children. Exposure of the children
to the worldly teaching of contemporary high schools with their
success-oriented values at the crucial period of adolescence would
cause a large-scale abandonment of Amish life by the children,
and might force the religion into extinction. On the other hand,
the prohibition of polygamy and certain forms of proselytizing, or
government imposition of zoning laws, oaths, blood transfusions
and vaccinations have not been regarded as threatening the essence of religious orders. The trend has been to proscribe basically
sociological phenomena (marriage,89 medical care,9 ° military service 9' and business 9 ) and to leave untouched basically religious
activities (religious training of chilren 3 and sacraments94 ).
Third, the courts implicitly test the degree of sincerity of the
individual in his religious beliefs. Judicial inquiry into the religious sincerity of the individual is permissible.95 The courts, in
addition, inquire into certain aspects of the religious sect which
also entail an implicit inquiry into the sincerity of religious belief.
The courts carry out this inquiry along two lines.
The courts first assume that where the practice of a faith,
such as the Amish religion, imposes burdens on members of the
sect by depriving them of social or economic advantages enjoyed
by the rest of society, religious beliefs are likely to be more sincere
than those of other religious faiths which have adapted to con88. 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Lewellyn v. State, 489 P.2d 511 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1971).
89. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
90. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
91. United States v. Campbell, 439 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1971).
92. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 ( 1961).
93. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
94. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
95. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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temporary social conditions. Hence, anyone wishing to engage in
the religious practice exempted by the courts must assume the
concurrent burdens of the religious faith.
Courts then look at the longevity of the religious practice.
Courts are more likely to condone an entrenched practice, such
as the Amish belief in isolationism dating from the sixteenth
century, or the use of peyote by the Native American Church"6
than they are to allow drug-use as part of a newly discovered
religious consciousness, even if the drug is a sacrament."
Fourth, the courts weigh the difficulty the state will encounter in the enforcement of the regulation in light of the exceptions
they are asked to make. An illustration is useful at this point. The
California Supreme Court found in People v. Woody, that the use
of peyote by the Native American Church did not frustrate the
intent of the drug use statute nor constitute any threat to the
enforcement of drug laws because the use of the drug could be
easily confined to a small, little known sect. Any rapid growth of
the sect's numbers by the conversion of non-Indians who sought
to use religion as a cloak of immunity for drug use would be
obvious, and the courts could easily weed out the unbelievers
from the believers. An exception in United States v. Leary,
however, would have been a "dangerous precedent," according to
the district court, which would have flooded the courts with instant converts and made enforcement of drug laws nearly impossible.
On the other side of the balance, the government's interest
has been judged on the basis of the secular values underlying
governmental regulation. Generally, the government's power to
regulate its citizens is superior to the power of the church to
regulate the actions of its petitioners; the government's interest
has never in fact had to be particularly compelling. Such diversified concerns as the government's interest in the fitness and dedication of its teachers,"8 one pleasant day of repose, recreation and
96. E.g., State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973). Peyote is
depicted in pre-Columbian remains in Mexico. Documents from the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries report that the old peyote cults extended from southern Mexico to northern New Mexico and Oklahoma. The most recent peyote religion was established in the
nineteenth century, and the Native American Church was incorporated in 1918. J. SLOTKIN, THE PEYOTE RELIGION (1956).
97. United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968); People v. Mitchell, 244
Cal. App. 2d 176, 52 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1966).
98. Bilken v. Board of Educ., 333 F. Supp. 902, 909 (N.D.N.Y. 1971).
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tranquility,99 uniform union membership,' 0 the preservation of
morale in the armed services,'"' public health, safety,'0 peace and
order'0 3 and life' 04 have been honored over free exercise defenses.
The most recent statement of the appropriate church-state
relationship is in Walz, where the Supreme Court declared:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment
and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will
not tolerate either governmentally established religion or
governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play
in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference.'05
However, if freedom of exercise means acting in accord with one's
beliefs and not just expressing them, there appears to be little
"room for play" left to religion after all of the government's interests are satisfied. Religion may exist without interference, but it
cannot practice without interference except in highly circumscribed circumstances. This reality is hidden, however, by principles such as "benevolent neutrality" through which the government (in the form of the courts) attempts not only to divorce itself
from the church, but to divorce itself from its own laws. Government is by no means neutral, but instead propagates moral values
by eliminating religious practices contrary to prevailing social
mores. It would do the same should it prohibit the practice of
segregation by Bob Jones.
Bob Jones University certainly does possess some of the characteristics of the four cases mentioned above. The belief in question, the separation of the races, is old and is sincerely held by
the members of the religion. The tenet may not involve a religious
rite, but it is certainly central to the faith. The fact that the
slavery and discrimination practiced in the South for three
99. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
100. Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Mass. 1970).
101. United States v. Campbell, 439 F.2d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1971).
102. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905).
103. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
104. John Fitzgerald Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d
670 (1971). But see Spense v. Bailey, 456 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972), where the impact on
the religious beliefs of the individual was great and the state's interest was minimal. The
court held that compulsory R.O.T.C. training on pain of forfeiture of a student's diploma
transgressed upon the religious freedom of a student who was a conscientious objector.
105. 397 U.S. at 669.
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hundred years lead to not only the system of segregated private
schools in Green, but also to the religious beliefs of Bob Jones
should be irrelevant.
Bob Jones may argue that it is a separate and easily identifiable religious entity. However, the government may counter
with the fact that a college is a transient culture. Considering the
turnover in students every year, Bob Jones has an enormous potential for spreading the belief in the inferiority of the black race.
As the intellectual elite, these students will have a greater than
average opportunity to teach their beliefs to and impose their
practices on others.
In countering Bob Jones's arguments, the government may
also pose the problem of enforcement. Should the Internal Revenue Service grant tax benefits to Bob Jones, the right to discrimination would be made available to any institution of elementary,
secondary or higher education which chose to establish itself as a
legitimate adjunct of Bob Jones or to any institution which professed the same long-standing fundamentalistic religious beliefs.
It is because Bob Jones peripherally follows the trends that
distinguish the three landmark cases from a general prohibition
of religious practices that the plight of the University presents a
unique and perplexing problem. However, it is predictable that
in the "balancing" process, since the interest of the government
in remaining financially aloof from discrimination is of constitutional proportions, and the subject is presently the cynosure of
litigation, legislation and public concern, courts are likely to favor
it over religious freedom. More likely, the courts will fall back on
the Parker reasoning, 06 which of course, is simply another manifestation of the consistent subordination of religious freedom to
other social and governmental interests.
CONCLUSION

Bob Jones University v. Connally presents two major dilemmas for the courts; defining the extent of permissible government
involvement in private racial discrimination, and finding the
most compatible solution to the conflict between the right of an
individual to practice his religion and the right of the black to be
judged apart from his race.
Although the recent rulings of the Supreme Court in Walz
and Moose Club indicate that the Court might refuse to expand
106.

See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
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the "government involvement" concept to include tax exemption
and deductibility of contributions, it is urged that such substantial financial benefits constitute active government maintenance
and support of organizations whose discrimination is inconsistent
with the government's role as guarantor of liberty under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. In any case, the courts should consider the plethora of criticism attacking this kind of support
which has arisen in the case law and literature.
Despite Bob Jones University's similarity to those cases in
which religious exercise has been held superior to compelling governmental interests, the courts will probably not accept a first
amendment defense. Tax exemption as a matter of legislative
grace is of little weight in relation to the constitutional interests
of the government in remaining uninvolved with racial discrimination.

